🚨We discovered Wallbleed, a vulnerability in the Great Firewall of China, allowing anyone leaks its memory. Since 2021, we reverse-engineered its logic, evaluated impact, and monitored patches. Wallbleed reveals censorship devices’ global privacy risks: gfw.report/publications/n…
What can go wrong when a UE tries to attach to a LTE/NB-IoT network?
A technical deep dive: "The Miserable State of Modems and Mobile Network Operators"
blog.golioth.io/the-miserable-…
#3GPP
"Advancing Obfuscation Strategies to Counter China’s Great Firewall: A Technical and Policy Perspective"
arxiv.org/pdf/2503.02018
#DeepPacketInspection
China advanced its QUIC censorship.
The GFW now decrypts QUIC Initial packets and extracts the hostname from the SNI extension—similar to its censorship of TLS over TCP.
My colleague details our findings in our new blog post:
upb-syssec.github.io/blog/2025/quic…
"This document specifies methods for the encryption and obfuscation of IP addresses for both operational use and privacy preservation. The objective is [...] to share or analyze data while protecting sensitive address information, [...] in the face of pervasive surveillance.
🚨 Our S&P’25 paper reveals rising regional censorship in China.
In addition to the national Great Firewall, Henan province runs its own firewall. Though less sophisticated, it’s more volatile and aggressive—once blocking 10× more domains than the GFW.
👉 gfw.report/publications/s…
Pretty wild security fail in a big operator's IMS - @o2 and @mavenir allowing their debug SIP headers through the P-CSCF to the UE, exposing the cell ID, IMSI and IMEI of the B party...
Notes on Packet Classification cover theoretical and practical implementation approaches. I find this area mildly boring, but it's a hard problem space with an N-dimensional headache.
dipsingh.github.io/HighSpeed-Pack…